

The Philosophy of Neoplatonism: Applied to the Systemised Self –

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Abstract

Neoplatonism describes reality as an ordered relation between unity and multiplicity: in Plotinus, the ineffable One or Good gives rise, not in time, but as an explanatory dependence, to Intellect, Soul, and the sensible world. This essay applies that account carefully to the Systemised Self, a proposed sociotechnical condition in which algorithmic systems can archive traces of a person, anticipate their actions, and return a predictive profile that can shape self understanding and choice. Maya, a student whose learning platform steadily narrows her studies to recommended tasks, provides a running case. Neoplatonism helps distinguish integration from genuine unity: a person may be rendered legible as one data profile while becoming less able to relate diverse experiences to reflectively chosen purposes and other people. Yet the One is not a hidden authentic self, and algorithmic coordination is not metaphysical emanation. The essay relates this account to the separate, Hegelian construct of the Hollow Absolute, reviews evidence and its limits, and presents the proposed Algorithmic Alienation Index as unvalidated. Neoplatonism's contemplative return suggests a question of orientation, not a technological cure: can Maya use connected tools while retaining the capacity to evaluate their ends, revise her course, and participate in shared life?

Keywords: *Neoplatonism, Plotinus, The One, Intellect, Soul, Systemised Self, Hollow Absolute, Algorithmic Alienation Index, digital mediation, Algorithmic Alienation*

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A – LIMITATIONS

This is a philosophical application, not a historical claim that Plotinus anticipated artificial intelligence or an empirical test of Neoplatonic psychology. The One, Intellect, Soul, participation, and return are metaphysical and ethical concepts; no digital trace or behavioural score measures them. The Systemised Self (Galu & Kairos, 2026a), Hollow Absolute (Galu & Kairos, 2026a), Algorithmic Alienation Kanbay et al. (2026) and Arkan et al. (2026), and the Algorithmic Alienation Index (AAI) (Galu & Kairos, 2026c) are proposed constructs with unresolved validity. For certainty, this essay is speculative and commentative, and not intended as a proof of concept. Contemporary studies establish particular capacities and effects of data systems, not a universal transformation of subjectivity. Calhoun's Universe 25 mouse experiment is used only as a bounded analogy about environments. The essay neither treats digital dependence as inherently harmful nor identifies multiplicity, disability related assistance, or ordinary delegation with alienation. Plotinus's hierarchical account and interpretation of malfeasance are contested and should not be used to moralise structural injury or individual difference.

1. Introduction

A fictional student closes her learning platform after an evening of lessons. The screen shows a coherent picture: Maya is 'advanced' in mathematics, 'at risk' in history, and most likely to continue with another short exercise. Yet the person who has finished the session is not exhausted by those categories. She is also curious about an unassigned poem, unsure about a family argument, and capable of changing her mind tomorrow. A system can gather the fragments of her activity into one profile without helping her discover what makes her life intelligible.

This is the difference between being integrated into a system and achieving meaningful unity. Neoplatonism gives this distinction unusual depth. Its account of reality moves from the One, beyond ordinary description, through Intellect and Soul to the many forms of sensible life; its ethical movement turns back toward intelligibility and the Good. ‘Movement’ does not mean a cosmic event in time, nor that particulars should be discarded. It describes dependence and orientation: how a plurality can be understood in relation to principles that make it intelligible (Kalligas, 2024; Plotinus, 1966–1988).

This essay asks whether that vocabulary can clarify the Systemised Self, a proposed condition in which algorithmic systems (transformer based large language models) help structure the person they purport to describe. Maya’s platform will recur as a limited case. The argument is not that its recommendation engine emanates from the One, or that contemplation makes someone invulnerable to platform power. Rather, Plotinus helps ask whether a digital profile’s unity is reflective and life giving, or simply reduces difference to what can be predicted.

2. Neoplatonism’s Intellectual Outline

‘Neoplatonism’ is a retrospective name for a diverse tradition that developed from the third century CE onward. Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) is conventionally regarded as its foundational thinker. His student Porphyry edited Plotinus’s treatises into the *Enneads*, six groups of nine. Later philosophers, especially Proclus in the fifth century, systematised and developed this inheritance rather than merely repeating Plotinus (Kalligas, 2024; O’Meara, 1993; Wildberg, 2016).

Plotinus’s basic principles are the One (also called the Good), Intellect (Nous), and Soul. The One is the ultimate source of intelligibility and existence but is not one object among others, or a powerful mind surveying the universe. It is ‘beyond being’ and predication: saying what

it is would make it one determinate thing, composed of distinctions, whereas Plotinus treats it as prior to such determination (Plotinus, 1966–1988, V.2.1; V.3.13).

Intellect is the level of intelligible reality and Forms. Unlike the One, it includes distinction, but its multiplicity is held together as a living intelligible order: many forms, apprehended in an act of thought. Soul mediates intelligible life and the sensible cosmos. Particular bodies and events form the changing world, receiving intelligibility without exhausting its source. This is not a ladder of separate physical locations, or a timeline in which the One first existed alone and then manufactured a universe.

Principle	Function in Plotinus	Caution in applying it
The One / Good	Transcendent source of unity and intelligibility	Not an individual, database, or ultimate self
Intellect (<i>Nous</i>)	Living intelligible order in which Forms are many-in-one	Not artificial general intelligence
Soul	Life, mediation, and ordering of the cosmos	Not an individual user's profile
Sensible world	Embodied, changing multiplicity	Not a lesser moral category of persons

3. Neoplatonism’s Key Theoretical Contributions

3.1 *Procession without a first moment*

Plotinus explains the dependence of the many on the One through procession, sometimes called emanation. The image of radiance helps: light depends on a source without a deliberate act of manufacture. But analogies fail if treated literally. The One does not lose material, divide into pieces, or change when what depends on it exists. Procession marks ontological explanation, not temporal production or a physical overflow (Plotinus, 1966–1988, V.2.1; Kalligas, 2024).

This matters for thinking about technology. A recommender system’s outputs are institutionally engineered: they depend on code, data, business objectives, workers, devices,

and users. Their emergence is neither timeless metaphysical procession nor natural necessity. Calling algorithmic influence an ‘emanation’ would hide accountable decisions behind an attractive but misleading analogy.

3.2 Difference held within intelligibility

Intellect is not unity by flattening every Form into the same thing. It contains intelligible difference in a relation of mutual implication. Plotinus thus offers a model for asking whether diverse experiences can be held together without being rendered identical. A profile can consolidate Maya’s searches into a single representation; it cannot, by that fact, establish that her mathematics, family life, poetry, and intentions form a meaningful whole.

The distinction is subtle: a useful summary can help a person notice patterns, while a totalising profile can recast every interest as evidence for the system’s own predictions. The issue is not fewer or more data points but whether the person can interpret the relation among them, including what the system did not collect.

3.3 Soul, attention, and ethical orientation

Soul in Plotinus is not reducible to a solitary human ego. It is a metaphysical principle of life and mediation, and his cosmology describes a World Soul as well as individual souls. On the ethical scale, the soul may become scattered in its attachment to external particulars or turn toward intelligibility and the Good. The upward image can sound like escape from bodily life, but Plotinus also understands virtue and the ordering of embodied life as part of philosophical ascent (Plotinus, 1966–1988, I.2; I.6).

Applied cautiously, this suggests that fragmentation is not simply having many interests. It arises when attention cannot relate them to reflectively endorsed ends. Maya’s unfinished assignments need not be a spiritual failure. The relevant question is whether she can see why


she is studying, explore beyond her predicted curriculum, and revise its recommendations in light of purposes the platform did not set.

3.4 Return is not fusion

The Platonic term *epistrophē*, or return, names the orientation of what proceeds toward its principle. For the human soul this includes self examination, intellectual understanding, and ethical formation, not literal travel or annihilation of personal distinctions. Plotinus’s language of union with the One marks a philosophical and contemplative limit (Plotinus, 1966–1988, VI.9.10–11), not permission to identify any technological system with the Good.

For the present argument, ‘return’ can only be a heuristic: can Maya interrupt habitual uptake, ask what a recommendation serves, and reconsider the goal? It is not evidence that she has recovered a pure self outside history, society, or tools.

NEOPLATONIC COSMOLOGY: explanatory dependence, not historical time



Individual ethical return is an orientation toward intelligibility,
not movement through this diagram or fusion with a digital system.

4. A Genealogy of Preceding Theory Informing Neoplatonism

Plotinus develops Plato creatively rather than reproducing a single Platonic doctrine. The Good in Republic VI–VII is presented as the source of truth and intelligibility; the divided line distinguishes modes of knowing, while the cave describes education as a difficult reorientation. In the Symposium, ascent from particular beauty toward Beauty itself likewise connects

plurality to intelligible value. Plotinus reshapes these resources into a more systematic metaphysics of the One, Intellect, and Soul (Plato, 1997a, 1997b; O'Meara, 1993).

The Parmenides's exercises concerning unity and plurality supplied later Platonists with a demanding field of problems. Aristotle's accounts of substance, form, actuality, and intellect formed another important interlocutor, although Plotinus rejects or revises parts of Aristotelian philosophy rather than simply combining the two. Middle Platonists had already interpreted Plato systematically and debated the status of Forms and cosmic principles. Neoplatonism is consequently neither 'Plato's original system' nor a generic timeless spirituality; it is a historical philosophical development through commentary, dispute, and synthesis (Wildberg, 2016).

The family resemblance to contemporary concerns should also be stated carefully. A Platonic suspicion that appearances can distract from intelligibility does not prove that digital media are deceptive. Ancient arguments about knowledge and contemporary critiques of behavioural prediction answer different questions. The genealogy provides conceptual resources, not empirical confirmation.

5. The Systemised Self: Context and Definition

The Systemised Self (SS) is a proposed sociotechnical condition in which systemic algorithmic mediation becomes consequential to identity, preference, and agency. It concerns more than an individual spending time online. The object of analysis is a recursive relation: activity is captured, modelled, used to organise available choices, and returned to a person as recommendations or classifications that may then shape later activity. This account treats dependence as structured by platforms, commercial incentives, institutions, and unequal alternatives, not as a defect located only in a user (Galu & Kairos, 2026a).

For our fictional character Maya, the loop is straightforward. She answers practice questions; the platform records her performance; its model assigns her a category; the next lesson follows that category; her new activity supplies further evidence. This can be beneficial: adaptive pacing can clarify difficult material, and accessible support can expand learning. It becomes a candidate for alienation if she cannot contest the classification, the platform obscures how it shapes the curriculum, her purposes are displaced by engagement objectives, or leaving would remove essential educational support.

Three distinctions prevent conceptual inflation:

Not sufficient for the SS	What further question is needed?
Frequent platform use	Is meaningful choice structured by the system?
A data profile exists	Does its return influence self-understanding or action?
A recommendation is accepted	Can the user assess, reject, and pursue alternatives?

Neoplatonism sharpens the last question without supplying an identity test. A profile is a representation of selected particulars; it is not Intellect, Soul, or the One. The analogy concerns how a person relates a plurality of experiences to chosen ends, not what metaphysical substance a person possesses.

6. The Hollow Absolute: Context and Definition

The Hollow Absolute (Galu & Kairos, 2026a) is the thesis’s Hegelian socio-critical construct, not a Plotinian principle. It names a hypothesised order in which algorithmically organised life appears complete and free while independent agency and mutual recognition may be weakened. ‘Hollow’ marks the difference between a managed appearance of freedom and reciprocal recognition (Galu & Kairos, 2026a).

Plotinus and Hegel must not be collapsed. The One is not a historically achieved community of recognition; the Hollow Absolute is not a defective One. Their contrast is analytical, not genealogical. Plotinus distinguishes intelligible unity from mere aggregation; Hegel directs attention to socially mediated freedom and recognition. Together they raise a question: might a system's apparent coherence be empty because its seamless interface cannot supply the mutual acknowledgment and collective authorship freedom requires? The potential consequences for a Hollow Demos is anticipated as Neurocratic Determinism (Galu & Kairos, 2026b). Where the appearance of democratic liberalism and elections remains but the societal, institutional and governing order has transformed by virtue of a citizenry gradually trading agency for hyper-personalised convenience: a resulting Aligarchy owns the algorithmic infrastructure and has the function of governance; in parallel to, the form of government, an unremarkably soft form of authoritarianism. This essay does not claim proof of anticipated political development, and is speculative and commentative only.

If our fictional character Maya mistakes successful prediction for recognition of her aims, the metaphor is useful. It overreaches if every recommendation is deemed alienating or individual insight is treated as a repair for institutional power. The Hollow Absolute remains a philosophical hypothesis; it cannot be inferred from one profile or an AAI score.

7. Contemporary Empirical Context

Evidence makes the problem concrete but not metaphysical. Kosinski et al. (2013) showed that digital traces such as Facebook Likes could predict personal attributes, not that a model knows the person as a whole. The Federal Trade Commission's review of major social media and video streaming services describes extensive collection, retention, use, and sharing of personal data (Federal Trade Commission, 2024). Such practices establish institutional stakes in what gets inferred.

Field experiments warn against claims of total behavioural control. Guess et al. (2023) found that switching Facebook and Instagram users from ranked to chronological feeds changed exposure and activity, but had limited short term effects on political attitudes. Systems can structure attention without determining belief. Parry et al. (2021) found discrepancies between logged and self reported media use, warning against treating either as a full account of experience.

Evidence	What it supports	What it does not establish
Digital-trace prediction (Kosinski et al., 2013)	Personal attributes may be inferred from traces	Full or infallible knowledge of a self
FTC data-practice review (2024)	Large-scale data collection and use are institutional facts	Identical impact on every person
Feed experiment (Guess et al., 2023)	Ranking alters exposure and behaviour	Short-term attitude transformation as a universal effect
Usage-report meta-analysis (Parry et al., 2021)	Self-reports can diverge from logs	That logs capture meaning or intention

None of these studies measures Neoplatonic unity, contemplative return, or a terminal Systemised Self. The empirical case is narrower but still consequential: data infrastructures can classify people and reorganise option environments, while the scale and meaning of those effects depend on context, design, and human purposes.

8. Formula and Boundary Conditions – Algorithmic Alienation Index

(AAI)

Algorithmic Alienation (AA) has a theoretical account in Kanbay et al. (2026) and partial qualitative grounding in Arkan et al. (2026). The AAI is a separate, proposed operationalisation; it is not an established validated scale. It expresses a tentative weighting of four dimensions:

$$AAI_base = 0.30(DAu) + 0.25(IAm) + 0.25(EDm) + 0.20(EDc)$$

$$AAI_adjusted = AAI_base \times (1 - RA)$$

- *DAu is diminished autonomy*
- *IAm identity ambiguity*
- *EDm eroded decision-making*
- *EDc emotional disconnection*
- *RA algorithmic resistance*

Each variable is provisionally normalised from 0 to 1. The weights represent a theoretical proposal, not percentages established by data. The original candidate boundary, $AAI_adjusted \geq .95$ and $RA \leq .05$, is exploratory only and must not be used diagnostically; both base and adjusted scores must still be reported (Galu & Kairos, 2026c).

Dimension	Intended focus	Example question for Maya
Dau	Capacity to formulate and pursue independent aims	Can she set a study goal before opening recommendations?
Iam	Clarity about the authorship of preference	Does she know why the platform's path seems desirable?
Edm	Deliberation and practical judgment	Can she compare alternatives beyond ranked exercises?
Edc	Emotional relation to activity	Does the process feel meaningful, indifferent, or draining?
RA	Effective critical or practical resistance	Can she alter the path or find legitimate alternatives?

Two scores must be reported. A high base score can be hidden by a high RA after multiplication; adjusted scores therefore cannot substitute for separate inspection of distress

and resistance. Nor does low reported alienation prove autonomy: the hypothesised SS includes phenomenological inversion, in which dependence may be experienced as freedom. This is a reason to investigate multiple forms of evidence, not to dismiss a participant's testimony.

Validation requires factor analysis, reliability, measurement invariance, criterion and discriminant validity, and comparison with alternative weights. Longitudinal research should test whether the index predicts outcomes beyond exposure, disability accommodations, work or study requirements, digital skill, socioeconomic conditions, and mental health. Behavioural logs and controlled changes to personalisation may complement self report with consent, data minimisation, and privacy protections. A friction experiment must not confuse loss of an accessibility tool with incapacity for independent judgment. Every claim needs a possible disconfirmation: if high scores do not predict the specified, independently measured outcomes, revise or reject the model.

Importantly for this essay, no AAI component is a proxy for the One, Intellect, Soul, virtue, or return. Neoplatonic concepts may guide qualitative questions about purpose and orientation; numerical thresholds cannot measure metaphysical participation.

9. Neoplatonism, Calhoun, and the Digital Behavioural Sink

Calhoun's Universe 25 experiment studied a mouse population in an enclosed environment with abundant food and constrained space. At high density, the colony displayed disruptions in social behaviour and care before its eventual decline (Calhoun, 1973). It is sometimes made to carry sweeping claims about human cities or technology. That inference is unsupported: humans are not mice, and a laboratory population does not model a digital society.

At most, the experiment is a bounded prompt about environments: abundance of available resources does not ensure conditions for flourishing. Maya can have endless exercises and still

lack time for unassigned inquiry. But her situation is institutionally and ethically unlike a mouse colony. She has reasons, relationships, rights, cultural meanings, potential collective action, and the possibility that adaptive software is an accommodation she values. Neoplatonic language does not turn environmental pressure into an individual's failure to 'ascend'. The relevant causes may lie in curriculum design, school funding, platform governance, and constrained access.


10. Direct Synthesis: Neoplatonism and The Systemised Self

Neoplatonism's most useful contribution is a distinction between totalisation and unity. Totalisation makes differences legible to one system of classification; unity concerns how they belong together without becoming interchangeable. These are metaphysical claims, not a ready made ethics of computing. Their value is heuristic: they prompt us to ask what togetherness a platform produces and whose ends it serves.

Maya's platform joins errors, response times, and completed lessons into a practical picture. This purpose bound coherence helps select instruction but cannot explain what education means in her life. If she accepts its 'at risk' label as final truth, a local representation becomes authority over the whole. If she contests it and treats a suggested lesson as one resource among several, classification has not become self definition.

The comparison can be expressed without pretending that she literally reproduces Plotinus's cosmology:

SYSTEM FEEDBACK LOOP — institutional and historical process



The feedback may assist or constrain her; it is not metaphysical procession.
Its governance, purpose, contestability, and alternatives matter.

An ethical ‘return’, translated cautiously, would mean Maya regains the question of ends: What is she learning for? What does the platform omit? Does its pace aid her purpose, or are alternatives unavailable? This is not a demand to reject mediation. No self interprets the world from outside language, education, history, or relationships. Introspection is not enough if no viable alternative to a compulsory platform exists.

The Hollow Absolute extends the analysis from an individual’s orientation to institutions e.g. Hollow Demos and Neurocratic Determinism (Galu & Kairos, 2026b). A predictive environment can feel complete while leaving users with little say in the rules, incentives, and public purposes governing it. Plotinus clarifies the difference between an apparently seamless set of outputs and intelligibility; Hegel clarifies why freedom also depends on social recognition. Neoplatonic ascent alone risks overlooking power. Its contribution must therefore be joined to empirical inquiry and political critique, not used as an inward substitute for them.

The practical test is neither ‘does the system unify’ nor ‘does the user log off?’ It is whether connected tools help people relate their plural interests to purposes they can reflectively endorse, question the conditions under which options are offered, and act with others to change those conditions when necessary. Assistance that enlarges our character Maya’s capabilities can support agency. Prediction that becomes unanswerable authority can narrow it.

11. Main Critics and Key Critiques of Neoplatonism

First, hierarchy can devalue embodiment. A ladder from the One toward sensible multiplicity can imply that bodies, practical life, or particular identities matter less. Plotinus does not simply equate the cosmos with evil, and his account of virtue complicates an escape only reading. Still, critiques of dualism have reason to ask who bears the costs when abstract inwardness is treated as superior to embodied need. In digital analysis, the risk is blaming a student for scattered

attention instead of examining inaccessible software, institutional pressure, or deliberate data extraction.

Second, the One's ineffability can weaken public accountability. If the highest principle exceeds speech and knowledge, readers may question how claims about it can be argued or shared. Plotinus offers arguments and analogies, but the tension remains. Applied politically, no appeal to a transcendent 'true unity' should override the testimony and disagreements of actual people.

Third, Neoplatonism does not supply a political economy of digital platforms. Its metaphysics cannot explain who owns an educational service, which measures are monetised, why a recommendation is selected, or how a school can contest a vendor. Without institutional analysis, talk of recollection or inward return may shift responsibility onto individuals.

Fourth, its own history contains internal disagreement. Proclus challenges aspects of Plotinus, including the undescended soul and the identification of matter with evil; later Platonists developed more elaborate hierarchies. Their disputes show that 'Neoplatonism' is not one uniform doctrine (Helmig & Steel, 2020; Wildberg, 2016). Plotinus's account of evil as privation or deficiency is philosophically contested (Plotinus, 1966–1988, I.8). Even if privation illuminates evil as absence of good, it cannot be taken to mean that concrete harms are merely unreal or caused by a victim's deficient unity. A business model, discriminatory classification, or deprivation of educational resources has material causes and responsible agents.

Finally, the analogy may be too broad: many theories value reflective agency, so does Neoplatonism add anything? It adds a warning against confusing comprehensive aggregation with intelligible coherence, and against confusing frictionless integration with meaningful

orientation. But its distinctive metaphysics remains an interpretive resource, not necessary proof of algorithmic alienation.

12. Discussion and Future Work

The comparison yields a hypothesis, not an apocalyptic forecast: where people cannot contest recommendations, reliance on returned classifications may accompany reduced ability to articulate goals, explore alternatives, or connect platform activity to broader commitments. A competing finding matters. If tailored lessons strengthen our character Maya's knowledge, confidence, and pursuit of unassigned interests, the service may extend rather than absorb agency.

Research should compare required and voluntary use, whose objectives shape recommendations, and outcomes that matter to participants. Longitudinal studies could combine interviews, consensual data, and curriculum changes to test the effects of restoring choice over pacing or subject discovery. Accessibility matters: dependence on a tool need not mean lost autonomy if it opens participation. Institutional research should ask whether students, teachers, and families can challenge classifications and shape data and curricula.

AAI development should remain separate from metaphysical language. Preregistered tests can evaluate candidate dimensions and thresholds; invalid or redundant items should be removed. Researchers should distinguish severe alienation with felt estrangement from the more speculative pattern of high behavioural dependence alongside low reported alienation. That inversion requires independent support and must never be inferred merely because self report conflicts with a researcher's theory.

Philosophically, test whether ‘plurality held in relation to a purpose’ clarifies experience beyond existing measures of autonomy, identity, or reflective agency. If it merely renames them, narrow the claim.

13. Conclusion

The fragmented digital self is not repaired by pretending unity means sameness, or that an individual can stand outside the systems that educate and describe them. Plotinus offers a distinction: a plurality can belong to an intelligible order without reduction to one category. But the One is neither a hidden self beneath Maya’s profile nor an algorithm with enough data.

Applied to the Systemised Self, Neoplatonism asks: does a platform help a person relate actions to reflectively endorsed ends, or make its prediction the authority that supplies them? The answer depends on evidence, alternatives, institutional accountability, and shared power. Maya’s profile may be useful; it cannot be the whole of her.

The payoff is a criterion for critique, not a mystical cure. Meaningful unity allows unpredicted interests, contestable descriptions, and relationships between distinct people. Maya closes the platform not to flee technology, but to pursue her chosen poem and discuss it with someone else. The tool remains in her world; it no longer gets the final word on what that world means.

14. Glossary of Technical Terms

AAI (Algorithmic Alienation Index): A provisional formula intended to organise dimensions of algorithmic alienation and resistance; not a validated diagnostic.

Emanation/procession: In Plotinus, explanatory dependence of lower realities on the One; not material overflow or an event in time.

Epistrophē: Return or reorientation toward a principle; in this essay a heuristic for reflection, not literal reversal of technological mediation.

Forms: Intelligible realities associated with Platonic and Neoplatonic accounts of what makes particulars knowable.

Hollow Absolute, the: A proposed Hegelian social-critical construct for apparent systemic completeness without the substance of genuine mutual recognition.

Intellect (Nous): The level of intelligible reality in which Forms are distinct yet belong to a living unity.

One/Good: Plotinus's transcendent first principle, beyond being and ordinary predication; not an individual mind or algorithm.

Participation: A relation through which lower realities depend on or manifest a principle without exhausting or dividing it.

Privation: An account of evil as deficiency or absence of good; a disputed metaphysical thesis, not a denial of concrete harm.

Soul: In Plotinus, the life-giving and mediating principle of the cosmos and individual life.

Systemised Self, the (SS): The proposed socio-technical condition in which algorithmic systems influence how personal identity, preference, and agency are formed and understood.

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