The Philosophy of David J. Chalmers Applied to The Systemised Self – Part 15, Masters Series

Abstract

David J. Chalmers’s philosophy of consciousness and virtual reality provides a framework for distinguishing behavioural prediction from subjective experience. His distinction between the easy and hard problems of consciousness, his arguments concerning philosophical zombies and psychophysical laws, his account of organisational invariance, his scrutability project, and his defence of virtual realism illuminate a difficult question raised by the concept of The Systemised Self: can a system model, shape, or even instantiate a self without possessing phenomenal consciousness? This essay argues that the Systemised Self should not be defined as a digital copy of a person or as a conscious machine. It is a condition in which algorithmic systems (transformer based large language models) increasingly mediate the formation, recognition, and governance of identity while remaining epistemically opaque about subjective experience. Chalmers helps separate three claims that are often confused: a system can predict behaviour; a user can experience a system as intentional; and a system may or may not possess experience. The essay connects this distinction to the Hollow Absolute, the Hollow Demos, Aligarchy, and Neurocratic Determinism. It defines a provisional Algorithmic Alienation Index, uses Universe 25 only as a limited analogy, and reviews evidence on consciousness measures, virtual embodiment, profiling, algorithmic reliance, and digital well-being. The conclusion argues that human agency requires more than preserving private experience: it requires institutions that keep the conditions of experience, interpretation, and collective judgment open to revision.

Keywords