The Philosophy of Daniel C. Dennett Applied to The Systemised Self – Part 14, Masters Series

Abstract

Daniel C. Dennett’s naturalistic philosophy of mind offers a distinctive route into the Systemised Self. Dennett rejects a Cartesian approach and explains consciousness through distributed and temporally extended ‘multiple drafts’, treating beliefs and desires as real patterns identified through the intentional stance, and understands human competence as an evolutionary achievement rather than a supernatural gift. Applied to the Systemised Self, these ideas suggest that a person is not replaced by an algorithmic copy. Rather, personal identity can become increasingly organised through external predictive models, ranked environments, behavioural classifications, and socially shared narratives. A consideration therefore is not that systems become conscious in the human sense, but that people and institutions begin to treat algorithmic system generated predictions as authoritative accounts of who a person is and what that person will do. This essay connects Dennett’s theory to algorithmic alienation, the Hollow Absolute, the Hollow Demos, Aligarchy, and Neurocratic Determinism. It defines a provisional Algorithmic Alienation Index, uses Universe 25 only as a limited analogy, and distinguishes predictive competence, intentional attribution, consciousness, and moral responsibility. The conclusion argues that Dennett’s compatibilism supports a demanding form of technological agency: freedom depends on the real capacity to reflect, learn, revise, and participate in the systems that predict and shape us.

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